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 What Makes Culture Special? 
Anne Phillips, LSE 
(Forthcoming in Political Theory as part of a symposium on Alan Patten’s Equal Recognition) 
In Equal Recognition, Alan Patten proposes a non-essentialist understanding of culture that 
nonetheless makes the interest people have in their culture weighty enough to justify some 
strong minority rights. In doing so, he acknowledges and indeed highlights the control 
element of cultures. What makes a culture, in his account, is not a set of shared practices 
and beliefs – there is always too much heterogeneity and transformation for that - but the 
existence of ‘an unbroken chain of intergenerational transmission’. ‘So long as one 
generation of a culture is controlling the socialization of a new generation or group of 
newcomers, there is cultural continuity.’ (p50) This is culture as socialization, not culture as 
essence, or culture as chosen. Patten talks freely of individuals as ‘subject’ to formative 
influences, ‘exposed’ to dominant discourses, inculcated into the culture through ’robust’ 
mechanisms of socialization, and ‘manipulated’ by elite group actors. He regards it as an 
advantage of his account that it ‘accents the role of power and avoids the dewy-eyed 
romanticism that sometimes characterises people’s attitudes about their own culture’ (p99). 
I very much endorse this understanding of the power relations through which cultural 
practices and traditions are typically transmitted. But I find it odd that this clear-eyed 
perception of the way cultural groups exert control over their current and future members 
then generates rights grounded in self-determination.  I find it particularly odd that the 
capacity to exert this kind of control becomes one of the things that makes cultures special. 
I share Patten’s critique of exclusionary nationalisms and the unequal treatment 
(discrimination, disparagement, marginalisation) often meted out to minoritised groups; but 
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as he rightly says, ‘liberals should have no trouble saying that an injustice has occurred’ in 
these circumstances (p150). The more challenging questions arise when what he calls basic 
liberal proceduralism is in place: when people belonging to cultural minorities are as secure 
as anyone else in their enjoyment of basic liberties and fair equality of opportunity, and yet 
these very conditions can still hasten the decline of their culture. A state that represents all 
its citizens, he argues, is obliged to do more than offer basic proceduralism. It is obliged to 
extend a fair opportunity for self-determination to everyone, and this means aiming at 
neutrality between different conceptions of the good. Since persons  ‘normally have a 
weighty interest in being able to fulfil their cultural values’ (p29), conceptions of the good 
that are threatened by cultural decline (with culture understood here in the pretty standard 
multicultural  way) are then singled out for special attention. This is the aspect I want to 
focus on here. 
The contrast between a basic and a full proceduralism is compelling.  As defenders of 
Quebec’s language policy have long argued, official bilingualism looks on the face of it to 
offer fair equality of opportunity to francophone and anglophone alike, but in the context of 
a dominant English language media, and greater employment prospects across the rest of 
Canada and the USA for those who are fluent in English, there is a ‘natural’ tendency for the 
use of French to decline. In Patten’s example (borrowed from John Terborgh), Misael moves 
his family from a remote area of the Peruvian Amazon in order to give his children better 
educational and employment opportunities, but in the process loses the capacity to pass on 
to them the language, skills, and traditional ways of Machiguenga culture. That he chose to 
move is not, in this account, enough of a reason to dismiss all concerns about the 
subsequent cultural loss. That his children are, in many ways, better off (indeed, that they 
themselves are unlikely to bemoan the loss of what they never knew) is also not a good 
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enough reason.  Misael has lost control over the socialisation of the next generation; he has 
had to cede this to his children’s school, the local community, his children’s peer group of 
friends, their partners as they grow up, and so on. In Patten’s account, this is a disruption of 
the mechanisms of cultural transmission, and even when basic liberties are protected and 
fair equality of opportunity is in force (and, of course, very often this is not the case), it is 
potentially a cause for concern.  
But there are many mechanisms of cultural transmission that are disrupted by social, 
economic, or geographic mobility, so why are might some disruptions be regarded as 
sufficiently problematic to justify strong cultural rights and not others? Patten has his own 
answer to this, revolving around the extent to which a disruption deprives members of one 
cultural or linguistic group of the opportunities for self-determination that are enjoyed by 
members of another cultural and linguistic group; a lack of fairness, that is, in the options 
and opportunities available to different people. My claim, in this comment, is that he also 
avails himself of a prior distinction between the disruptions experienced by language 
groups, indigenous peoples, and national minorities, and those experienced by members of 
particular social classes or people previously subjected to particular gender regimes. 
Twentieth century literature is full of stories of individuals who were enabled, often through 
the support of some inspirational school teacher, to move into a social milieu where they 
became subject to different socialising influences: the miner’s son, for example, who goes 
away to university, and finds himself unable, on his return home, to connect easily with his 
parents. Never quite at home in the new world that opens up to him through this  university 
degrees, but no longer at home in the family and community through which he had been 
socialised, this character lives his life with a sense of dislocation, of never quite fitting. He 
experiences what we could well term cultural loss. The story is rarely told from the 
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perspective of the parents, but they too presumably feel that much has been lost even while 
something has been gained, and may regret their inability to pass on to their son’s children 
(the story is almost always about a son) those ways of thinking about oneself and others 
that they had passed on to their own children.  
Many people will sympathise with this sense of loss. The story may, moreover, 
indicate some unfairness in state practice, so not just an unfortunate but inevitable effect of 
social mobility, but something that could be at least partially addressed by policy change. It 
may be, for example, there has been a regime in schools of treating those who enter manual 
trades as lesser beings than those who go to university, and that this has encouraged a 
disparagement of working class people and working class communities that the newly 
successful graduate then imbibes on his trajectory of upward mobility. We might, as a 
consequence, argue for changes in the practices and ethos of schools that will help combat 
this effect. I doubt, however, if we would frame the problem as a potential failure of 
neutrality between different conceptions of good, and even in describing it as a story of 
cultural loss, it is unlikely that we would look to solutions that might help halt the cultural 
decline. Why not? 
To take a different example, think of the mechanisms of cultural transmission as 
regards gender. There are powerful institutional forces, operating through the economy, 
politics, media, law, education, and the family, that combine to transmit and legitimate 
particular gender expectations and roles. In most instances, one cannot identify a group that 
controls the transmission process or sets itself up as the authority pronouncing on the 
appropriateness of particular gender roles, but there is enough coherence to the process for 
many of us to think it legitimate to talk of a gender order or gender regime. Parents who 
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transport their children to a different kind of gender regime – not because they wanted to 
live under different gender codes, but because (like Misael) they wanted to provide 
themselves and their children with better educational and employment opportunities – may 
find themselves unable any longer to control the socialisation process. It may be, for 
example, that in the dominant gender regime of their previous life,  it was the norm for 
parents to select appropriate life partners for their children, and for parents and children 
alike to accept forms of arranged marriage as a way of securing the closeness of familial 
relations. Under the changed conditions, where the children are exposed to the influences 
of their school and school friends, to (often misleading) discourses about self-fulfilment and 
romantic love, and to new expectations about parent/child relations, the children may begin 
to balk at the idea of parents choosing their life partner. (They frequently do, and this is the 
point at which previously consensual arranged marriage sometimes turns into forced 
marriage, for not all parents are willing to accept this change.)  
Again, we may sympathise with the parents’ sense of loss, and may feel it is well 
described as a cultural loss. If, moreover, the schools have been teaching children that 
arranged marriage is pre-modern and wrong, or failing to differentiate in their discussions 
between arranged and forced marriage, we might well see this as an illegitimate 
disparagement of cultural difference that fails to extend an equality of recognition. But 
whatever we might then recommend in terms of policy change, I doubt if we would think 
that fair opportunities for self-development required us to reverse the decay of this 
particular gender order. I particularly doubt if the liberal who is the target reader of Alan 
Patten’s book would favour this. 
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My point here is not just the familiar one rehearsed in the feminism versus 
multiculturalism debates: the idea some kinds of ‘cultural loss’ are more appropriately 
mourned than others; or that what appears as a loss to some members of a group can be 
very much a gain for others. Though Patten has little to say about these issues, I take it that 
he would agree with this charge. Indeed his comment that ‘some cultures may be so grossly 
oppressive or chauvinistic as to lack any value at all’ (p66) is tougher than anything Susan 
Moller Okin ever had to say about oppressive cultures. He is not arguing for a right to 
cultural preservation; he is not saying that any evidence of cultural loss thereby triggers a 
right to cultural protection; he explicitly rejects arguments from the badness of cultural loss 
to focus on the case for fair treatment of cultures. We care about how cultures fare, he 
argues, ‘because we care about the ease with which people having culture-related 
preferences can access options that correspond  with those preferences’ (p159); we care, 
that is, about the fair treatment of people with different culture-related preferences, not 
about the preservation of culture per se.  But when he makes unbroken chains of 
transmission central to his understanding of culture, and the potential disruption of those 
chains the first stage in identifying cases of unfair treatment, he lays himself open to the 
suggestion that he favours preferences related to tough socializing mechanisms over those 
related to milder ones. Though he offers a potentially broad definition of culture as ‘what 
people share when they have shared subjection to a common formative context’ (note 
again the language of subjection), he takes this to mean people sharing a common social 
lineage, not people who might owe their social formation to a particular class culture or 
particular occupational culture or particular gender regime. His paradigm cases of cultural 
loss are language groups, indigenous peoples, and national minorities, and part of the 
justification for this selection is that these are groups that have sustained themselves (in the 
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past) through powerful mechanisms for inter-generational socialisation, and have previously 
enjoyed unbroken chains of cultural transmission.  He is preoccupied, that is, with groups 
that have hitherto had the ability to control the socialization of new generations and 
incomers but are in danger of losing this to a majority or privileged or in some other way 
now dominant socializing group. He is entirely clear about the power relations associated 
with culture – the capacity to regulate and constrain and impose – yet it is this previous 
capacity for control that seems to provide the measure of significance in thinking about who 
might qualify for cultural rights.  
In his argument, the more explicit basis for differentiation is that some conceptions 
of the good are more significant for self-determination than others. Some conceptions are 
said to occupy a particularly pivotal position in the set of our ends; some are experienced as 
of a more non-negotiable character; and some have special recognitional salience, such that 
the failure to treat them neutrally could convey the judgment that the person pursuing 
them is worthless or deficient. But this hardly seems compelling as a basis for separating out 
the ‘cultures’ that might claim minority rights from those that cannot. Deaf culture would 
seem to qualify on these criteria as much as Machiguenga culture. The reason it doesn’t, for 
Patten, is partly because he has a somewhat optimistic view of liberal anti-discrimination as 
already providing an adequate basis for challenging racism, sexism, disablism and so on. 
‘Standard liberal theories’, he argues, ‘already have plenty of ammunition for condemning 
state-sponsored racism, sexism, and so forth, and so it is not obvious that we need recourse 
to an idea of recognition to say what it going wrong in these cases.’ (p164). Basic liberal 
proceduralism, by implication, is perfectly adequate for these.  
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I agree with him in his critique of basic liberal proceduralism, but see this as applying 
well beyond his paradigm cases. I am, moreover, reluctant to follow a line of argument that 
seems to identify the groups whose treatment demands more than basic proceduralism on 
the basis of how strongly they have, in the past, managed to control their members.  My 
own somewhat moderate defence of multiculturalism falls into what he would probably 
describe as the ‘derivative’ category, the derivation in my case being from notions of 
equality. Like him, I am very much concerned with the ways seemingly neutral state policies 
in practice favour particular sub-groups within a society. But I see inequality of treatment as 
something that is produced and reproduced across a range of different contexts - race-
related, gender-related, class–related, culture-related, to name but a few – and I find it 
more helpful to think about the parallels and intersections than to pick out some of these as 
representing distinct paradigms of inequality or injustice. Culture in the broad sense of 
shared values, meanings, norms, and conventions is part of how all inequalities are 
sustained, while culture in the narrow sense of shared social lineage is one of the axes 
around which unequal majority/minority relations revolve. It is, however, only one of these. 
Arguments for cultural accommodation that draw on the limitations of basic liberal 
proceduralism share much common ground with feminist critiques of the public/private 
divide as obscuring gender inequalities, or analyses of institutional racism that explore the 
non-intentional workings of racial power. Each of these can generate policy 
recommendations that go beyond the guarantees of basic liberties and fair equality of 
opportunity that figure in a Rawlsian conception of justice. What is gained by treating 
‘culture’ as special? 
The one context in which it seems to me plausible to view the case for cultural rights 
as qualitatively distinct from other arguments for equality is where there is an issue of 
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historical injustice. Despite the parallels I have drawn above, I do see some grounds for 
viewing the kind of cultural loss experienced by Misael as distinct from the cultural loss 
experienced by my upwardly mobile miner’s son and his parents, or the cultural loss 
experienced by parents of the now resistant children who refuse to accept an arranged 
marriage. My reasons, however, would be informed by evidence of a history of 
dispossession, discrimination, or subordination, and of the ways in which that history 
continues to be expressed in present inequalities. This is not something explored in Equal 
Recognition. History does figure in the argument: it figures as the evidence that a group is 
the kind of group that previously enjoyed the capacity for cultural transmission but is now 
succumbing to the larger power of the dominant community. But since it is important to 
Patten’s argument that he is addressing cases where standard notions of justice are already 
met – where basic proceduralism is in place – he is less focused than some other accounts 
on the way historical mistreatment bleeds into the present. His argument, as I understand 
it, does not depend on claims about the group in question having been subjected to unjust 
relationships in the past. It depends, rather, on the fact that the group used to be able to 
exert particularly effective socialising power. I find this hard to accept as the compelling 
justification for minority cultural rights.  
 
 
 
